We consider strong law of large numbers (SLLN) in the framework of gametheoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001) . We prove several versions of SLLN for the case that Reality's moves are unbounded. Our game-theoretic versions of SLLN largely correspond to standard measure-theoretic results. However gametheoretic proofs are different from measure-theoretic ones in the explicit consideration of various hedges. In measure-theoretic proofs existence of moments are assumed, whereas in our game-theoretic proofs we assume availability of various hedges to Skeptic for finite prices.
Introduction
In the framework of game-theoretic probability, proof of SLLN is simple if Reality's moves are bounded. In [4] we showed that a single simple strategy based on past averages of Reality's moves forces SLLN for the case of bounded Reality's moves. For the special case of the coin-tossing game path behavior and convergence rate of SLLN can be very explicitly stated ( [5] , [8] ). However when Reality's moves are not bounded, the proof becomes more complicated due to consideration of availability of hedges to Skeptic. Under the requirement of the collateral duty that Skeptic has to keep his capital always nonnegative, he has to use some form of hedge at each round. In Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), Kolmogorov's SLLN is proved under the availability of the variance hedge (quadratic hedge). Shafer and Vovk consider the case that the price of the variance hedge is announced by Forecaster for each round, but for simplicity in this paper we omit Forecaster from the protocol and consider the case that hedges carry constant prices throughout the game. Availability of the quadratic hedge is natural and convenient. However the purpose of this paper is to investigate SLLN under other types of hedges.
In measure-theoretic probability, the usual and most elegant form of SLLN is stated for the sample averagex n = (1/n)(x 1 + · · · + x n ) of i.i.d. random variables, where only the existence of the measure-theoretic expected value E|x n | < ∞ is assumed. However Kolmogorov's SLLN proved in Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) does not correspond to this version and a question remains whether a corresponding game-theoretic result holds or not. Some considerations of this problem are given in Chapter 4 of [9] . The usual measuretheoretic result depends strongly on the assumption of identical distribution of the random variables. On the other hand the basic feature of the game-theoretic probability is that the game is a martingale and there is a question of how to impose identical behavior to Reality at each round. In this paper we argue that the assumption of the identical distribution in measure-theoretic framework can be replaced by the availability of countable number of weak hedges.
For the most part we follow the standard proofs of SLLN in measure-theoretic probability. For example we use truncation and Kronecker's lemma. However our proofs differ from standard measure-theoretic proofs in explicit construction of Skeptic's strategy which requires Skeptic to observe his collateral duty. In addition our proof is more an extension of the proof for the bounded case of Chapter 3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) , rather than an extension of their proof in Chapter 4 using the quadratic hedge.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up notations and give some preliminary results. In Section 3 we prove a version of SLLN under the assumption of availability of a single hedge. In Section 4 we prove a game-theoretic version of SLLN for i.i.d. variables under the assumption of availability of countable hedges. We extend it to a Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law in Section 5. Finally in Section 6 we discuss various aspects of our proofs and the assumption of availability of infinite number of hedges.
Notation and preliminaries
In this section we summarize our notations and some preliminary results. We follow the notation of Shafer and Vovk (2001) . ξ = x 1 x 2 . . . denotes an infinite path of Reality's moves and ξ n = x 1 . . . x n denotes the partial path up to round n. For a strategy P of Skeptic, K P n (ξ) = K P n (ξ n ) denotes the capital process. Starting with a positive initial capital of K 0 = δ > 0, Skeptic observes his collateral duty by using P if
We also say that P satisfies the collateral duty with the initial capital δ. Note that P satisfies the collateral duty with initial capital δ if and only if P/δ satisfies the duty with the initial capital 1. In view of this fact, we simply say that P satisfies the collateral duty if P satisfies the duty with some initial capital δ > 0. When P satisfies the collateral duty, the capital process K P is called a (game-theoretic) non-negative martingale. We call a function h(x) of Reality's move x a hedge if it is non-negative (h(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R) and has a finite price 0 < ν < ∞. Skeptic is allowed to buy arbitrary amount of h(x) with the unit price ν. In Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), they consider the variance hedge h(x) = x 2 . In view of the unbounded forecasting game in Chapter 4 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), we first consider the following protocol with a single hedge.
The Unbounded Forecasting Game with a Single Hedge Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ R.
Availability of the variance hedge h(x) = x 2 is very convenient, because Skeptic can then construct a martingale which is a quadratic form of Reality's moves. This fact is used by Shafer and Vovk in their proof. However SLLN can be proved under other hedges. In Section 3 we will prove that SLLN is forced if the absolute moment hedge of order 1 + ǫ,
is available to Skeptic. Naturally we are tempted to consider the absolute moment hedge h(x) = |x| in the above protocol, corresponding to the measure-theoretic SLLN of i.i.d. random variables with finite expectation. However it is essential to point out that SLLN is not forced under the availability of h(x) = |x| alone. Since this fact is important, we state it as a proposition. The following proposition is stated in view of the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law in Section 5.
Proposition 2.1. Consider the unbounded forecasting game with a single hedge h(x) = |x| r , r > 0. There exists no strategy P of Skeptic satisfying the collateral duty, such that
Proof of this proposition, following Section 4.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) , is given in Appendix A. Unfortunately it requires a measure-theoretic argument. Because of Proposition 2.1 with r = 1, we need to assume that more hedges in addition to h(x) = |x| are available to Skeptic in order to prove SLLN corresponding to the sample average of i.i.d. random variables with finite measure-theoretic expected value E|x n | < ∞.
denote a set of hedges available to Skeptic in each round. For example in Section 4 we consider the set of symmetric call option type hedges ("strangle hedges", Chapter 10 of Figure 1 . We assume that h λ is available to Skeptic with a constant finite positive price v h λ . Skeptic is allowed to buy any amount of countable number of hedges h 1 , h 2 , . . . from H. If Skeptic buys V i ∈ R units of h i , i = 1, 2, . . . , then he is required that the sum ∞ i=1 V i v h i converges to a finite value. Note that here for a set of hedges we are allowing Skeptic to sell a hedge (V i < 0), whereas in the case of a single hedge Skeptic can obviously only buy the hedge. By allowing Skeptic to sell hedges, he can combine various hedges to construct a variety of hedges (Chapter 10 of [3] , Section 9.3 of [1] ). Based on these considerations we set up the following protocol.
The Unbounded Forecasting Game with a Set of Hedges Protocol:
In our proofs we combine Skeptic's strategies to force intersection of events. From Section 3.2 of Shafer and Vovk (2001), a strategy P weakly forces an event E if it satisfies the collateral duty and lim sup n n K P n (ξ) = ∞ for every ξ ∈ E. In this case we also say that E happens almost surely. If lim sup n is replaced by lim n , then P forces E. Now consider two events E 1 and E 2 . We say that a strategy P weakly forces E 2 conditional on E 1 if it satisfies the collateral duty and Proof. Let P 1 denote a strategy weakly forcing E 1 and let P 2 denote a strategy weakly forcing E 2 conditional on E 1 . Let P = (1/2)(P 1 + P 2 ). Note that
n (ξ) = ∞. It is clear that Lemma 2.1 can be generalized to the sequence of events E 1 , E 2 , . . . , such that E i is weakly forced conditional on
Finally we state and discuss the game-theoretic martingale convergence theorem given in Lemma 4.5 of Shafer and Vovk (2001).
Lemma 2.2. A non-negative martingale K P converges to a non-negative finite value almost surely.
As seen from the proof of Lemma 4.5 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) this theorem is based on Doob's upcrossing lemma in the game-theoretic setting. We use this lemma in our proofs in an essential way. As discussed at the beginning of this section, when we say that K P is a non-negative martingale, it means that Skeptic observes his collateral duty (1) with the strategy P starting with a positive initial capital K 0 > 0. In this case he can construct another strategy Q satisfying the collateral duty starting with an arbitrary small initial capital δ > 0 such that 
SLLN with a single hedge
In this section we give sufficient conditions for SLLN in the unbounded forecasting game with a single hedge. For simplicity we only consider symmetric hedge h(x) = h(|x|) depending only on |x|. We assume several conditions for h(|x|) ≥ 0.
For some c > 0 and for all α ≥ 1 h(|x|) |x| α is monotone increasing or decreasing for |x| ≥ c.
(A3) For some c > 0,
In our proof the condition (A3) is essential for SLLN with a single hedge, as shown in Proposition 3.1 below. On the other hand (A2) and the symmetry of h are assumed for convenience for our proofs. c > 0 in the conditions can be easily handled and for simplicity we assume c = 0 in our proofs below. By (A2), there exists some α 0 > 0 such that h(|x|) is monotone increasing in |x| for α > α 0 and monotone decreasing in |x| for α < α 0 . Now we state the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that a single hedge h(x) satisfying (A1)-(A3) is available to Skeptic. Then in the unbounded forecasting game with the single hedge
Take h(x) = |x| 1+ǫ , ǫ > 0, then (A1)-(A3) hold and SLLN is forced. SLLN is forced even for h(x) = |x|(log |x|) 2 .
However as shown in Proposition 2.1, SLLN is not forced for h(x) = |x|. Before starting the proof of Theorem 3.1 we show that the condition (A3) is also necessary for the existence of a strategy weakly forcing SLLN. 
Proof of this proposition is given in Appendix A. The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of Theorem 3.1 in a series of lemmas. By Lemma 3.1 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we only need to show that Skeptic can weakly forcex n → 0.
Under the conditions (A1)-(A3) Skeptic can force E 1 .
Proof. By (A3) let C = n 1/h(n) < ∞. Consider the following strategy P
where 0 < ν < ∞ is the price of the hedge h. For this strategy, starting with the initial capital of K 0 = 1, the capital process K n is written as
Therefore P satisfies the collateral duty and on E C 1 K n diverges to +∞. Therefore P forces E 1 .
Note that the same argument with C = n 1/n 2 shows that Skeptic can force
Furthermore Lemma 3.1 implies the following Borel-Cantelli type result.
Lemma 3.2. Let E 2 = {ξ | |x n | ≥ n for only finite number of n}.
Under the conditions (A1)-(A3) Skeptic can force E 2 .
Proof. By (A2) h(|x|)/|x| is monotone. If it is monotone decreasing (A3) can not hold. Therefore h(|x|)/|x| has to be monotone increasing and h(|x|) is itself monotone increasing.
where
It should be noted that this lemma is essentially the first part of Borel-Cantelli lemma. For convenience we state a game-theoretic version of the first part of Borel-Cantelli lemma. The proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1 and omitted. 
The following lemma concerns the evaluation of the variance of truncated variables in the usual proof of SLLN.
Under the conditions (A1)-(A3) Skeptic can force E 3 .
Proof. First consider the case that h(x)/x 2 is monotone increasing. Then adjusting some constants we can assume h(x) ≥ x 2 for all x without loss of generality. Then
is given in (5). Therefore Skeptic can force E 3 . Next consider the case that h(x)/x 2 is monotone decreasing. For 0 < z ≤ n we have
Multiplying both sides by n 2 /h(z) we have
and E 1 ⊂ E 3 .
From Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.4 Skeptic can force
Proof.
Therefore for all z ≥ 0 we have
and this proves the lemma. 
Under the conditions (A1)-(A3) Skeptic can weakly force E 4 conditional on E 1 .
. Consider the following strategy P + :
Then by Lemma 3.5
and P + satisfies the collateral duty. Similarly the strategy P − with M n = −ǫK n−1 /n, V n = ǫK n−1 /h(n) satisfies the collateral duty. By the game-theoretic martingale convergence theorem (Lemma 2.2) both K P + n and K P − n converge to a non-negative finite value almost surely. Then both log K P + n and log K P − n converge to a finite value or −∞ almost surely. As in Lemma 3.3 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) we use the inequality t ≥ log(1+t) ≥ t−t 2 for all t ≥ −1/2. Then the logarithm of the capital process for P + starting with K 0 = 1 is bounded as
On E 1 , each of the following infinite sums is finite.
By the inequality
) on E 1 the second term on the right-hand side of (9) converges to a finite value:
Therefore conditional on E 1 P + weakly forces lim sup
Similarly conditional on
It follows that the case lim log K P + n = −∞ is eliminated and log K P + n converges to a finite value almost surely. Now consider (9) for the interval n ≤ i ≤ n ′ . Then
Now by Cauchy criterion we see that n x n /n converges almost surely.
SLLN with countable hedges
In this section we prove a version of game-theoretic SLLN which corresponds to the usual measure-theoretic SLLN for the sample average of i.i.d. random variables with finite expectation. As shown in Proposition 2.1, the availability of a single h(x) = |x| is not sufficient. It seems that an essential ingredient of measure-theoretic proofs of SLLN for this case is that the expected values of truncation are uniformly bounded by the assumption of identical distribution. Hence we consider that countable number of hedges are available with constant prices at each round of the game. We assume that the prices are given in such a way that the game is coherent, i.e. the game does not present an arbitrage opportunity to Skeptic (see Section 7.1 of [7] or [8] ). As mentioned in Section 2, for our game-theoretic version of SLLN we assume that the set of symmetric call option type hedges with integral exercise prices k = 0, 1, 2, . . .
are available to Skeptic. In particular |x| = (|x| − 0) + is available to Skeptic. Let ν k denote the price of h k (x) = (|x| − k) + . We also assume that Skeptic is allowed to sell hedges and combine them, as long as he observes his collateral duty. For example he can create a new hedge
This new hedge carries the price of ν k − ν k+1 ≥ 0. We may call this hedge "symmetric bull spread" (c.f. Chapter 10 of [3] ).
For truncation arguments below we also consider "symmetric trapezoidal hedge". For k ≥ 1 define
with the price
which is a single trapezoid. Symmetric bull spread and the positive side of symmetric trapezoidal hedge are depicted in Figure 2 and Figure 3 , respectively. The rest of this section is devoted to a proof of this theorem. As in the previous section we prove it by a series of lemmas.
Lemma 4.1. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can force E 2 in (6).
The left-hand side can be bought with the total finite price of ν 0 . The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 4.2. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can force E 3 in (7).
Proof. At round n Skeptic is to buy (k + 1) 2 units of the symmetric trapezoidal hedge T k for each k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. We note
Dividing the above by n 2 and summing up over all rounds n = 1, 2, . . . , we have
Now we evaluate the total price of the left-hand side. Since T k is available at each round, the price is the same if we replace x n by x 1 in T k . Then
As noted above |x 1 | is available to Skeptic with finite price ν 0 , so that the left-hand side is also available to him with the total finite price
The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1.
In the following x n hedged by (|x n | − n) + is denoted as
This has the price ν n . Similarly we denotex n,n = −x n + (|x n | − n) + which is −x n hedged by (|x n | − n) + . Note that x n,n ≥ −n,x n,n ≥ −n.
On E 2 , x n,n and x n I {|xn|≤n} differ only for finite number of n. Therefore conditional on E 2 , Skeptic can force 
By (11), conditional on E 2 , Skeptic can force
Similarly Skeptic can force E 5 with x n,n replaced byx n,n . Finally the following lemma proves Theorem 4.1 in conjunction with Kronecker's lemma.
Lemma 4.4. Under the condition of Theorem 4.1 Skeptic can weakly force
, and consider Skeptic's strategy betting ǫK n−1 /n on x n,n − ν n at round n. Then his capital at the end of round n is
By the choice of ǫ and |x i,i /i| ≤ 1,
so that from log(1 + t) ≥ t − t 2 for t ≥ −1/2, his log capital is bounded from below as
In the right-hand side the third term is bounded on E 5 . By considering this inequality for the interval n ≤ i ≤ n ′ , we have
As in the proof of Lemma 3.6, considering both x n,n andx n,n , log K n converges to a finite limit almost surely, and thus by Cauchy criterion we see that
x i,i − ν i i converges almost surely.
As proved in Appendix B, ν n → 0 as n → ∞. Then by Kronecker's lemma we have
In the above, (1/n)
x i,i /n also converges to 0. Since x n and x n,n differ only for finite number of n on E 2 , it is concluded thatx n converges to 0 almost surely. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law
In this section we consider a remarkable generalization by Marcinkiewicz and Zygmund (See [2] , [6] ) of Kolmogorov's measure-theoretic SLLN for i.i.d. random variables with finite expected value E|x n | < ∞. Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law asserts that for i.i.d. random variables x 1 , x 2 , . . . with E|x n | r < ∞ for 0 < r < 2 and Ex n = 0 when 1 ≤ r < 2, the following measure-theoretic SLLN holds
Considering the meaning of the hedge |x| r for x in betting games, we treat the case 1 < r < 2 and for this case establish a game-theoretic version of Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund SLLN. As noted in Proposition 2.1, the availability of a single h(x) = |x| r is again not sufficient. Hence here, for the game-theoretic Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund SLLN we assume that the following set of hedges are available to Skeptic.
Let ν kr denote the price of h kr (x) = (|x| r − k) + and let ν k 1/r denote the price of h k 1/r (x) = (|x| − k 1/r ) + . Also assuming that Skeptic is allowed to sell and combine these hedges within his collateral duty, we state the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1. Let 1 < r < 2. Suppose that the set of hedges H r in (12) is available to Skeptic. Then in the unbounded forecasting game with H r Skeptic can force (x 1 + · · · + x n )/n 1/r → 0. The proof of Theorem 5.1 proceeds almost in the same way as that of Theorem 4.1. However we have to make different uses of hedges from H 1r and from H 2r . At first we enumerate relevant events.
E 2r = {ξ | |x n | r ≥ n for only finite number of n}.
n 2/r I {|xn| r ≤n} < ∞}. Proof.
The left-hand side can be bought with the total finite price of ν 0r . The rest of the proof is the same as in Lemma 3.1. Proof. Consider the following trapezoidal hedge
with the price µ kr = ν k+2,r − ν k+1,r − ν kr + ν k−1,r . At round n Skeptic is to buy (k + 1) 2 units of the hedge T kr for each k = 0, 1, . . . , n−1. We note
Dividing the above by n 2/r and summing up over all rounds n = 1, 2, . . . , we have
n 2/r I {|xn| r ≤n} .
As in the previous section, for the consideration of the total price, we can replace T kr (x n ) by T kr (x 1 ). Then the left-hand side can be evaluated as
Since |x 1 | r is available to Skeptic with finite price ν 0r , the left-hand side is also available to him with the total finite price
So far we have used hedges from H 1r for forcing various events. In the following x n will be hedged by elements from H 2r . We hedge x n by h n 1/r (x n ) = (|x n | − n 1/r ) + . Write
This has the price ν n 1/r . On E 2r , x nn,r and x n I {|xn| r ≤n} differ only for finite number of n. Therefore conditional on E 2r , Skeptic can force 
Both terms are finite on E 2r . Now we use the ǫ-strategy as before.
Lemma 5.4. Under the condition of Theorem 5.1 Skeptic can weakly force
Proof. We take ǫ as
, and consider Skeptic's strategy betting ǫK n−1 /n on x n,n − ν n 1/r at round n. Then his capital at the end of round n is
By the choice of ǫ and |x ii,r /i 1/r | ≤ 1,
In the right-hand side the third term is bounded on E 5r . By considering this inequality for the interval
In the above log K n converges to a finite limit almost surely, and thus as before
x ii,r − ν i 1/r i 1/r converges almost surely.
We now need to take care of n
Proof. Since r > 1
Also for |x| ≥ n 1/r we have |x| r−1 ≥ n 1−1/r . Therefore
It follows that the prices of (|x| − n 1/r ) + and (|x| r − n) + have to satisfy
Note that ν ir → 0 as i → ∞ by the argument in Appendix B. Then the right-hand side converges to 0 as n → ∞ by Cesàro's lemma (12.6 of [10] ). Now by an extended form of Kronecker's lemma (12.7 of [10] 
1/r also converges to 0. Since x n and x nn,r differ only for finite number of n on E 2r , it follows that (x 1 +· · ·+x n )/n 1/r converges to 0 almost surely. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
Some discussions
In this paper we proved various game-theoretic versions of SLLN for unbounded variables. In Section 4 we proved a version corresponding to the sample average of i.i.d. measuretheoretic random variables. There we assumed availability of countable symmetric call option type hedges. We chose this set of hedges for convenience and concreteness. Other choices are equally conceivable, as long as the set of hedges is rich enough to produce step-function type hedges (cf. Figure 2) .
We might as well assume that if a hedge h is available to Skeptic, all other hedges weaker then h are available to him with price no more than that of h. We call a set of hedges H weakly closed if
We might argue that this is a reasonable assumption, because if h is available to Skeptic, he can ask to buy a weaker g with the same price as h and someone should be willing to sell g to Skeptic with the same price, because it presents an arbitrage opportunity to the seller. If H is weakly closed, then for each t ∈ R
has to be available to Skeptic. This shows that if H is weakly closed, then the entire distribution function of the Reality's move x is priced in the game. The assumption of weakly closed H seems to be too strong from game-theoretic viewpoints. However we should mention that in measure-theoretic proofs the probability distribution is assumed and truncation is freely used.
The discussion on generality of probability games in Chapter 8 of Shafer and Vovk (2001) convincingly argues that measure-theoretic martingales can be reduced to gametheoretic martingales. If we interpret Theorem 3.1 in measure-theoretic terms and just rewrite our proof in measure-theoretic terms, we obtain the following result. is uniformly bounded, then P (lim n Y n /n = 0) = 1.
Except for Proposition 2.1 we could avoid measure theory to establish our theorems. We believe that this again shows effectiveness of game-theoretic proofs as we have shown in our previous works ( [5] , [4] ).
For the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong law in Section 5 we have given a game-theoretic proof for r > 1. We also assumed availability of two kinds of hedges for convenience as we discussed in Remark 5.1. If we make the blanket assumption that H is weakly closed, then we believe that measure-theoretic proof of the Marcinkiewicz-Zygmund strong for 0 < r < 1 can be translated to game-theoretic proof without too many modifications. From game-theoretic viewpoint however, the case r < 1 does not seem to be natural.
A Proofs of Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 3.1
Proof of Proposition 2.1.
We argue by contradiction. Suppose there exists Skeptic's strategy P which allows Skeptic to observe his collateral duty with the initial capital K 0 = 1 and lim n K P n = ∞ whenever s n /n 1/r → 0, where s n = x 1 + · · · + x n . Consider a random strategy of Reality, where each x n , n > ν, is independently chosen as P (x n = 0) = 1 − ν n , P (x n = n 1/r ) = P (x n = −n 1/r ) = ν 2n .
Here ν is the price of h(x) = |x| r . Then by the second part of measure-theoretic BorelCantelli lemma 1 = P (|x n | = n 1/r i.o.) = P (|x n |/n 1/r = 1 i.o.).
Note that if s n /n 1/r → 0, then x n /n 1/r → 0 because s n n 1/r = n − 1 n 1/r s n−1 (n − 1) 1/r + x n n 1/r . Therefore (14) implies that P (s n /n 1/r → 0) = 0. Then by our assumption P (K P n → ∞) = 1. However under the randomized strategy of Reality K P n is a measure-theoretic non-negative martingale and its measure-theoretic expectation is E(K P n ) = K 0 = 1. Then by Doob's martingale inequality (e.g. Theorem 14.6 of [10] )
, ∀c > 0, ∀n.
and P (sup n K P n ≥ c) ≤ 1/c. But this contradicts P (K P n → ∞) = 1. .
Proof of Proposition 3.1.
Consider a random strategy of Reality, where each x n for n, h(n) > ν, is independently chosen as P (x n = 0) = 1 − ν h(n) , P (x n = n) = P (x n = −n) = ν 2h(n) .
The rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Proposition 2.1.
B Proof of the fact lim k→∞ ν k = 0
Consider the identity for x ∈ R:
For each real x, the right-hand side is actually a finite sum and there is no question on the convergence. On the other hand consider the identity
Since {ν k } is a monotone non-increasing sequence of non-negative reals c = lim
exists. If c > 0 then, ν 0 > ∞ k=0 (ν k − ν k+1 ). But then Skeptic can sell |x| and buy the right-hand side of (15) and he is certain to make money. This contradicts the assumption of coherence.
